Cognitive
structure stage two (about 2 to 4 Months onward.)
Aggregation
of conjectures.
The second stage in
Greenspan and
Shanker's theory, as explained in their book "The First Idea", concerns the gradual gathering together of the
separated islands of conjecture enabling them to coalesce into vaguely
linked clumps. As explained previously, associations are formed on the
basis of ideas of circumstances, events, actions, and outcomes that
co-occur with some regularity, either at the same time or within a
relatively short interval. Regularity of co-occurrence is of course
determined by the apparent similarity of these events actions etc. In
this process the determination of what is similar and what is
dissimilar is the essential ingredient and it too is determined by
association. Of most importance in determining the idea of similarity
is the dual coding of the event action etc. with the emotional
experience it provides.
Automatic
self generating groupings.
To
understand the formation
of
conjectures, and how they could automatically form themselves into self
generated groups, a close look at how associations work is necessary.
As explained in the section on the first stage of development the
initial conjectures are mostly concerning the dual coding of external
sensory information with internally generated emotional reactions to
the eternal sensory information. These are the first conjectures
the sensory information A is (always accompanied by
or followed by) emotion B. The initial sensory
information appears very changeable and thus amorphous and
unclear. But gradually small sensory elements are discerned by the
infant as associations are formed with the repeated inclusion of these
specific sensory elements. These specific elements over time find
themselves repeated in groups with other specific sensory elements in
such a way that gradually these sensory elements are always grouped
together to form initial
concepts.
Conjecture
modification.
These
first conjectures do not need to be
true or correct. Indeed the main function of the brain is to improve,
modulate or correct existing conjecture. These first rigid conjectures
have to be subsequently modified to make them more consistent with the
child's continuing experience of the world. These initial conjectures, are over time found to
have exceptions, or to have sensory elements included that
should not be included, or are missing some sensory elements. Thus they
force their own modification to a better form, which more
closely matches the child's continuing experience. This takes place by
making conjectures more complex by including exceptions, by
adding new elements, and subtracting others.
Types
of groupings.
Gradually
a differentiation enables
conceptual conjectures to be grouped together, and purely abstract
conjectures to be grouped together. Each group is identified by the
child as having similar elements associated together in each
group. Thus we have the beginning of conjectures that are concepts, and
the beginning of conjectures that concern how concepts interact with one
another. Eventually in a similar way conjectures that are objects are
separated from from conjectures that are more abstract concepts. Although it could be said that from there the
child has to differentiate other conjectures from those just
described that are increasingly more and more
specific, this would not be correct. Even the explanation given
above does not really match the child's experience in differentiating
conjecture out of the chaos of sensory information.
The
world of infant experience.
In
reality what the child
experiences is not in any way determined by the way adult humans
structure conjectures as categories that fit neatly one inside
another. What happens, with infants in constructing conjectures that
are concepts etc., happens simultaneously and spontaneously.
Thus they are more likely to form a conjecture that is initially more
specific rather than general. For instance the concept of a
primary caregiver probably is differentiated out of the confused muddle
before the concept of people or moving objects or even
the more inclusive concept of a physical object. The
reason this is the case is that, what tends to be differentiated out of
the chaos of sensory data, tends to be those elements that most often
occur and are thus associated with various other elements. In the early
life of an infant no sensory elements are more likely to occur than
those elements that make up a primary
caregiver.
Greenspan and Shanker stress
the importance of the child building a relationship with caregivers at
this second stage and the role of caregivers in determining that this
development proceeds well:
"The second stage
involves helping a baby use her emotional interest in the world to form
a relationship and become engaged in it. With warm nurturing the baby
now becomes progressively more invested and interested in certain
people. No longer will just any face or smell do. It has to be the
mother's face or smell. From day one the baby begins distinguishing
primary caregivers from others; from two to five months, this ability
reaches a crescendo though joyful smiles and coos and a deep sense of
pleasure and intimacy."
One of the criticisms of
Piaget has been that he pays insufficient attention to the factor of
learning, and more particularly of how children learn, as opposed to
what they learn. Learning is not just one thing. Children not only
learn but they also learn certain specific skills along the way that
make learning easier (they learn how to learn).
Greenspan and Shanker's approach by contrast is more
concerned with the process the infant uses in learning than
any specific thing learned.
Primary
caregivers.
Certain sensory
elements that appear to be recurring for infants are
the images, sounds and smells of primary caregivers, usually mothers.
These sensory elements build in two ways. They build into a
conjectural concept of an entity separate from the rest of external
reality. Secondly they are associated with mostly pleasurable
emotions that the infant experiences when they are present. These in
turn are associated with ideas of circumstances, events, actions, and
outcomes to become conjectures that can thus be grouped together as
similar or differentiated as different from other conjectures.
Greenspan and Shanker suggest that these relationship
conjectures are necessary precursors for higher learning abilities to
develop and thus for intelligence to develop. They
continue:
"In addition,
higher levels of learning and intelligence depend on sustained
relationships that build trust and intimacy. This progress involves
more than simply fulfilling concrete needs. The concrete person that
just wants 'things' never becomes a fully reflective thinker in life's
most important areas. For example if we look at other
people just as things we will not understand how they think
and feel. Understanding others and feeling empathy for them comes from
investing other human beings with one's own feelings. This ability,
however, begins with first relationships. It depends on nurturing care
that creates a sense of intimacy. When a baby becomes interested in her
primary caregiver as a special person who brings her joy and pleasure,
as well as a little annoyance and unhappiness, it is not only emotional
interactions that begin flowering. A new level of intelligence is also
reached. She is now learning to discriminate the joys and pleasures of
the human world from her interests of the inanimate world."
Further
convergence.
The interrelatedness of
these early
conjectures proceeds as infant conjectures lead from one type of
understanding to a different type of understanding.
Conjectures provide skills that enable new conjectures. For instance
the pleasure provided by caregivers initiates infant motivation to
understand caregivers. Greenspan and Shanker explain:
"Her joy and
pleasure in her caregivers enable her to decipher patterns in their
voices. She begins to discriminate their emotional interests, such as
joy and indifference, and annoyance. She begins to figure out facial
expressions as well. Thus begins the long journey of learning to
recognize patterns and organize perceptions into meaningful categories."
Socialization.
By learning to guess how
caregivers are feeling and moderating their
own behavior to influence adult emotions, infants at
this stage are starting to become socialized. Or more
correctly they are beginning to socialize themselves.
Greenspan and Shanker continue:
"In forming a
deeper, more intimate relationship, the baby is also learning her first
lessons in becoming a social being, the cornerstone of being part of a
family, group or community, as well as eventually, a culture and a
society."
A
shared world.
Although
at this stage there is on
separate defined self there is nevertheless some progress
toward a conjecture of personal uniqueness as Greenspan and
Shanker portray:
Also a baby's
sense of self and consciousness is moving forward. Now that she is
discriminating the human and inanimate worlds, the infant goes from
feeling a part of a global world of sensations to a sense of 'shared
humanity.' There is no separate, defined sense of 'self' yet, but from
shared intimacy with caregivers, a growing sense of special human
feelings is emerging."
Convergence.
Certain events tend to repeat in the world, and a
child, who has become
interested in the world, begins to notice this. With this comes
speculation of continuance on the part of the infant. The
child
suspects that certain things continue. Each experience the child has
with mommy coalesces
into a group of experiences the child experiences as mommy experiences.
At the same time all the experiences the child has also coalesces into
experiences that happen to me and simultaneously experiences that
happened to others. Eventually these grouped snapshots of experience
will become concepts. They will become mommy me and others. At this
stage they are not yet concepts they are still too vague. They are
conjectures but amorphous ones, and still somewhat temporary.
These converging, but
still mostly unformed ideas, provide further anticipation of the world
and with that disappointment and confirmation of conjectures about
reality. Each confirmation of these anticipations or expectations
renders it just a bit more real and a bit more likely to be grouped
with similar anticipations and expectations.
|